Exploiting Spin-Orbit Torque Devices as Reconfigurable Logic for Circuit
  Obfuscation by Yang, Jianlei et al.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS 1
Exploiting Spin-Orbit Torque Devices as
Reconfigurable Logic for Circuit Obfuscation
Jianlei Yang, Member, IEEE, Xueyan Wang, Student Member, IEEE, Qiang Zhou, Member, IEEE
Zhaohao Wang, Member, IEEE, Hai (Helen) Li, Senior Member, IEEE
Yiran Chen, Fellow, IEEE and Weisheng Zhao, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Circuit obfuscation is a frequently used approach
to conceal logic functionalities in order to prevent reverse
engineering attacks on fabricated chips. Efficient obfuscation
implementations are expected with lower design complexity
and overhead but higher attack difficulties. In this paper, an
emerging obfuscation approach is proposed by leveraging spin-
orbit torque (SOT) devices based look-up-tables (LUTs) as
reconfigurable logic to replace the carefully selected gates. It is
essentially impossible to identify the obfuscated gate with SOTs
inside according to the physical geometry characteristics because
the configured functionalities are represented by magnetization
states. Such an obfuscation approach makes the circuit security
further improved with high exponential attack complexities.
Experiments on MCNC and ISCAS 85/89 benchmark suits show
that the proposed approach could reduce the area overheads due
to obfuscation by 10% averagely.
Index Terms—Spin-Orbit Torque, Magnetic Tunnel Junction,
Reconfigurable Logic, Circuit Obfuscation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Reverse Engineering of ICs/IPs
W ITH the rapid increasing requirements of embeddedsystems and the internet of things (IoTs), application
specific integrated circuits (ASICs) are playing an important
role in the semiconductor products market than ever. However,
the reverse engineering (RE) attacks are inducing much more
severe threats to hardware design intellectual property (IP)
[1][2] and great challenges for information security. Reverse
engineering originally arisen from the analysis of hardware
for commercial or military advantage [3][4][5]. Usually it
attempts to extract the knowledge or design information from
the original creation without intellectual property permitted,
and reproduce them based on the obtained information. The
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involved objects vary from mechanical systems, electronic
devices, computer software, biological fragment, chemical
samples, or any kinds of components with IPs.
The concept of intellectual property plays an im-
portant role in semiconductor industry while the recy-
cling/remarking/redistribution constitutes a serious threat to
foundries or design houses, such as Xilinx against Flextronics
[6] in 2013. Flextronics bought Xilinx FPGA chips at a
discounted rate, but remarked these devices as higher grade
and sold them for elevated prices, thereby violating Xilinx
IP polices through misrepresentation and exposing them to
liabilities. Under the tough competition among semiconductor
suppliers, some companies with reverse engineering tech-
niques exploit the intellectual property of their competitors by
incorporating the IP into their own products, without providing
any credit or compensation to the IP’s rightful owner, which
definitely delivers quite a lot of harmfulness to research and
development innovation [7].
The popular digital circuit watermarking and fingerprinting
techniques [1] are passive IP protection schemes because they
do not prevent RE from happening or make it more difficult.
Watermark and fingerprint can be embedded into the IP to
make each instance of the IP unique. When necessary, they
can be revealed to show the authorship or ownership of the IP
and identify the parties that misuse the IP. Although it is dif-
ficult or impossible to completely remove the watermark and
fingerprint, RE attackers can still extract valuable information
from the IP and reproduce the IP illegally. The existence of
watermark and fingerprint in the IP can deter RE attacks, but
will not increase the complexity of RE.
An active and effective approach to intellectual property
protection is required, of which obfuscation is a vital solution.
Circuit obfuscation seeks to modify the design and implemen-
tation of a circuit in order to make it difficult to interpret
and hence increase the cost and complexity of RE attacks
while the complexity to perform obfuscation for the designer
is acceptable [8][9].
B. Circuit Obfuscation for Anti-reverse-engineering
Various obfuscation approaches have been proposed, of
which key insertion based [10][11] and replacement based
[12][13] are two popular trends in state-of-art. Key insertion
based approaches obfuscate combinational circuits by inserting
some additional XOR/XNOR key-gates. Carefully selecting
insertion positions can make the key extraction complexity
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exponential, i.e., improve the security with particular insert-
ing procedure [11]. Replacement based approaches replace
some conventional logic gates with configurable logic units
which could be programmed to perform different boolean
functionalities while maintaining an identical appearance to
reverse engineers. A camouflaging algorithm by judiciously
selecting gates to replace with configurable CMOS cells,
whose functionality can be configured by true or dummy
contacts in the layout level to perform as 2-input logic gates
while maintaining an identical appearance [12][13]. For a
reverse engineer attacker, it is very difficult to figure out the
functionalities of these logic units while a popular approach is
to perform attempts for many times. However, these configured
true or dummy contacts still could be detected by de-layering
and cross-section imaging using SEM or TEM techniques [14]
so that it still has some potential security risks. Another kind
of approach is structural obfuscation which is performed by
structural transformation on sequential circuits [9][15], and
could even reduce the circuit area or delay compared with the
un-obfuscated design occasionally. However, without a correct
key or configuration, the gate replacement approach could
make the IC’s functionalities incorrect while the structural
obfuscation only degrades the IC’s performance and does not
change the IC’s functionalities. Therefore, the attackers could
still learn some IC design details with an incorrect key even if
the design is processed by structural obfuscation, which will
make it be vulnerable to malicious threats such as hardware
Trojans insertion. And consequently, this will make the IC less
secure.
SRAM based LUT structure is adopted as configurable logic
units for gate replacement while a 2m-to-1 multiplexer and
2m configuration memory cells are utilized [13]. Such an
approach allows to dynamically configure the replaced logic
gates so that the reverse engineers could not find sufficient
physical/geometric information. However, adopting SRAM
cell as obfuscated logic usually occupies relative high chip
area overhead which are unacceptable for practical implemen-
tations. A nonvolatile reconfigurable logic is proposed as look-
up-tables in [16] which is very close to our idea in this paper,
however no practical applications were demonstrated in there
works. A hybrid design scheme was proposed for reverse-
engineering prevention by exploiting emerging spin-transfer-
torque devices [17], which is very similar to our proposed
methodologies in this work. However, the work in [17] did not
take any insight into circuit level evaluation so that it lacks of
details for supporting the claimed improvements. Additionally
the programming operations of STT-CMOS circuits require a
relatively large current so that the CMOS transistors have to
be enlarged to provide enough write current, i.e., the overhead
of chip area occupation will be too large to be acceptable. In
spintronics community, the spin-Hall-effect (SHE) is discov-
ered for building a promising spin-orbit-toruqe (SOT) structure
while its write current is largely reduced compared with
conventional pure-STT structure [18][19][20][21]. Hence, the
hybrid SOT-CMOS circuits are utilized in this work to realize
the reconfigurable logic with a lower write current among
LUTs programming operations.
G1
G4
G6
I1 &0
0
0
?
&0
0
0
?
&0
0
0
?
I2
I5
I4
I3
O1
O2
C1
C2
C3
Fig. 1: Circuit partition based attack example (an independent
sub-circuit path is drawn in dashed lines) [22].
C. Main Contributions
In this article, we investigate how to leverage SOT device as
reconfigurable logic for efficient circuit obfuscation instead of
SRAM as memory cells to circumvent the above drawbacks.
Building LUTs with hybrid CMOS/SOT structures as obfus-
cated gates allows to improve the anti-reverse-engineering
security with lower overhead compared with existing ap-
proaches. In the next section, we briefly introduce some basics
of circuit obfuscation and SOT mechanism. The third section
presents the design of SOT-LUT structure, programming and
sensing techniques in circuit level. Following that, CMOS/SOT
hybrid design is carried out and the power, area, timing char-
acteristics are extracted by various simulations. The SOT-LUT
units are configured as several logic gates for replacing circuit
units to perform circuit obfuscation. Experimental results are
discussed later and concluding remarks are provided at last.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Basics of Circuit Obfuscation
The objective of chip reverse engineering is to extract the
large scale layout as gate-level netlist automatically by de-
packaging, de-layering, imaging and annotation [14]. Further-
more, the gate-level netlist could be even converted to a higher-
level abstraction which is very useful for the attackers to
understand the system functionalities. Given an obfuscated
circuit, a tricky attacker may apply various attack approaches
to resolve the original netlist of IC, including testing based
attack, circuit partition based attack (CPA), side channel
attack, brute force attack and etc. [11][12]. In this work, we
will mainly evaluate our obfuscation against CPA since it is
the most popular attack approach. CPA applies the divide and
conquer methodology, which means an attacker can first par-
tition the circuit to independent sub-circuits, then target each
independent sub-circuit individually [22]. An independent sub-
circuit is a sub-circuits whose functionality cannot be affected
by other parts, and can be tested separately from a functional
IC. The attack complexity can be significantly reduced by CPA
even when an obfuscation approach is resilient to all other
restore attacks. As demonstrated in Fig. 1 for motivational
example in [12][22], an attacker cannot resolve the function-
alities of C1, C2 and C3 individually by IC testing techniques,
thus has to apply brute force with a complexity of 33. However,
a clever attacker can first target C1 and C2 in the sub-circuit
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Fig. 2: Configuring MUX4X1 to perform 16 possible 2-input
1-output boolean functions with camouflage connectors [23].
marked with dashed lines, then C3 will become an isolate
unit and can be resolved in constant time. Thus the attack
complexity will be 32 instead of 33.
The feasibility to perform obfuscation is arisen from the
concept of reconfigurable logic by leveraging LUTs in FPGA.
Multiplexers (MUXs) could be configured as different func-
tional logics according to the different LUT-mask which is
physically composed of memory bits. Besides that, configuring
logic building blocks with camouflage connectors is a popular
way to realize various functionalities [24]. Many approaches
have been proposed to build camouflage connectors [24].
Implementing camouflage connectors is to build a particular
structure in CMOS or other emerging technologies that can
behave as either a connection or isolation, and appear to
be physically identical under optical or electron microscopy.
MUXs could be configured with camouflage connectors, with
each input connected to Vdd for logic true or Vss for logic
false by two camouflage connectors, but only one is pro-
grammed to be a connection, the other one is programmed to
be an isolation. A 2m-to-1 MUX can be configured to perform
any 22
m
possible m-input boolean functions. As shown in Fig.
2, a MUX4X1 is configured as 2-input logic gates. When
input lines X1, X2, X3 and X4 are configured to be 1110,
the MUX4X1 will perform the functionality of NAND gate
[23].
The configured structure with camouflage connectors will
be realized among fabrication procedures and cannot be
dynamically reconfigured after manufacturing [12]. For the
MUXs configured with memory cells, users could dynamically
reconfigure their functionalities after manufacturing but these
memory cells usually bring more overhead on chip area
occupied [13]. Typically the MUXs with SRAM configured
structure increased the overall area by 35%∼83% which is
not easily accepted for practical implementations.
B. Spin-Transfer and Spin-Orbit Torque Mechanism
Spin-Transfer Torque (STT) based device has been rapidly
evaluated as one of the most promising spintronics applications
[25] with several advantages [26]. A typical STT device
is realized by a stacked multi-layer sandwich structure that
composed mainly of these layers: an oxide tunnel barrier
(TB), a free magnetic layer (FL) and a pinned magnetic
layer (PL) as shown in Fig. 3(a). The magnetization direction
of the free (storage) layer can be switched by an external
applied magnetic field or reversed by a spin-polarized current
Jread flowing through the junction from either parallel state
(P) or antiparallel state (AP) to that of the reference layer.
The switching mechanism occurs in the manner of in-plane
when the current density exceeds a critical density value
Jc that has been found lately as low as 8 × 105A/cm2 in
CoFeB/MgO/CoFeB stack structure [26]. As the spin-MTJ
device surface is usually small (e.g. 113nm× 75nm or even
less), the critical current is thereby less than one hundred µA
and could be generated by a typical CMOS current source. In
addition, Jc could be reduced by integrating the perpendicular
magnetic anisotropy (PMA) in the free layer of the MTJ so
that the stable magnetization points out-of-plane instead of
in-plane [27][28].
However, the popular usage of two-terminal MTJ device
still poses several potential operations issues. The write path
and read path always share the same current flowing branch so
that it is difficult to optimize the write and read performance
at the same time. Furthermore, the asymmetry property of
write and read operation leads to different operation energy
and delay, and thus a larger current is usually required to
finish the write operation, which may lead to reliability issues.
To overcome the above bottlenecks, spin-orbit interaction was
recently investigated to provide an alternative write approach.
Spin-orbit interaction means that the electron spin angular
momentum interacts with its orbital angular momentum. In
some materials, spin-orbit interaction can be strong enough
to generate significant spin accumulation from an unpolar-
ized charge current. The spin accumulation induces a torque
(named spin-orbit torque, SOT) to switch the magnetization
[29].
As shown in Fig. 3(a), a free layer (FL) with perpendicular
magnetization is sandwiched between an oxide-insulator and a
nonmagnetic heavy metal (HM) strip (e.g. Pt/Ta) with strong
spin-orbit interaction. The key idea of such a structure is that
an in-plane charge current flowing through the heavy metal
can generate the SOT for the magnetization switching, which
is known as the Rashba effect [18][19] or spin Hall effect
(SHE) [20][21]. The SHE-induced spin current JSHE can be
injected into FL layer which is adjacent to HM layer, resulting
in a torque which could achieve the deterministic switching of
perpendicular magnetization. Such a SHE-induced switching
requires only on in-plane write current flowing through the
heavy metal instead of through the MTJ, thus the risk of barrier
breakdown could be reduced. For the in-plane magnetization,
deterministic switching can be achieved by SHE current only.
However, an additional magnetic field is usually required to
make a deterministic switching for the perpendicular magne-
tization. Meanwhile, the initial SOT is more easily triggered
for the case of perpendicular magnetization compared with
the conventional STT since the injected spin are orthogonal
to the anisotropy axis. And thus, fast write operation could be
achieved with an energy efficient manner due to the required
lower critical current. These advantages have been validated
by the experimental demonstrations [18][19]. Early research
usually requires an external magnetic field to assist the switch-
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(b) SHE-MTJ physical integration with CMOS (a) SHE assisted MTJ structure
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Fig. 3: (a) Physical structure demonstration of spin-Hall effect assisted MTJ switching mechanism. (b) SHE-MTJ physical
integration with CMOS fabrication process.
(b) 2T1M bit cell schematic
      rWL: word line of read operation
      wWL: word line of write operation
(a) Equivalent resistance network and w/r operation
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Fig. 4: (a) Equivalent resistance network of SHE-MTJ write or read operations. (b) Schematic illustration of 2T1M bit cell
design.
ing due to the induced SHE is not enough [20][21]. But
most recent research has shown that field-free magnetization
reversal could be realized by spin-Hall effect and exchange
bias when a perpendicularly magnetized Pt/Co/IrMn structure
is introduced for ferromagnetic/anti-ferromagnetic interface
[30][31][32].
The hybrid fabrication process with MTJ and CMOS tech-
nology is shown in Fig. 3(b) where the MTJ stack has a vertical
structure similar to CMOS fabrication with low enough anneal-
ing temperatures during the process. One advantages of this
fabrication is that the MTJ integration does not take much die
surface except for the sensing CMOS circuits and the contacts
necessary to connect the MTJs with MOS transistors. The total
cost of SOT-LUT based obfuscated circuit could be lower
than the SRAM-LUT based obfuscated circuit because only
several additional masks are needed to integrate the SHE-MTJ
at the backend process. One of the major issues for the SHE-
MTJ fabrication is the height of oxide barrier, which should
not be too low (e.g., < 0.7nm) to exhibit the TMR effect
and not too high (e.g., > 2.5nm) to keep the low resistance
value. A well-controlled and precise deposit process for the
oxide barrier is required to avoid the mismatch variation and
ensure the good SHE-MTJ sensing performance. Such hybrid
CMOS/MTJ integration process has been realized by several
research institutes [33][34]. Also several magnetic memory
chips have been fabricated with MTJ/CMOS integration by
Hideo Ohno’s group [35] and Everspin Technologies [36].
The equivalent resistance network of a three-terminal SOT
device is illustrated in Fig. 4(a) for write and read operations.
Among read operation procedure, a read current Jread is
injected between T1 and T3, flowing through the equivalent
resistance of stacked MTJ RMTJ and half of the equivalent
resistance of heavy metal RHM/2, while the readout result
is determined by high RMTJ in anti-parallel state or low
RMTJ in parallel state. Among write operation procedure,
a write current JSHE is injected between terminal T2 and
terminal T3, flowing through the equivalent resistance of heavy
metal RHM , which generates a spin-orbit torque by spin-Hall
effect to switch the FL layer (usually named as SHE-assisted
switching). Hence, the write and read current paths have
been decoupled as two independent branches so that separate
optimization is available for tuning. The decoupled write
and read paths of three-terminal SOT device could resolve
some major disadvantages of conventional two-terminal STT
device, such as high-power dissipation, selection disturbance,
and larger transistors required in the CMOS writing circuit.
For these reasons, SOT magnetic random access memory
(SOT-MRAM) has attracted a significant amount of attention
and makes it one of the best nonvolatile memory candidates
[37][38]. However, the key disadvantage of SOT device is that
each bit-cell requires two access transistors as shown in Fig.
4(b). A typical SOT memory cell requires 2T1M for one bit
storage, where one access transistor is utilized as word-line for
read operation and another for write operation. Such 2T1M
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(c) Read circuit with pre-charge sense amplifier 
(b) Circuit diagram of SHE-MTJ write driver
(a) Full schematic of SOT-LUT
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Fig. 5: A 2-input SOT-LUT architecture: (a) Full schematic of SOT-LUT, (b) Circuit diagram of SHE-MTJ write driver, (c)
Read circuit with pre-charge sense amplifier scheme.
cell results in larger bit-cell footprint so that it may not be an
attractive option in high-density memory applications despite
all its advantages. In this work, SOT device is adopted to build
look-up-table structure while all bit-cell could share the same
access transistor, which will not introduce much overhead in
chip area occupied.
III. LEVERAGING SOT DEVICE AS RECONFIGURABLE
LOGIC FOR CIRCUIT OBFUSCATION
A. SOT Circuit Design for Reconfigurable Logic
Leveraging spin-transfer torque or spin-orbit torque devices
as reconfigurable logics have been investigated in several
previous works, such as [39][40][41]. Taking a 2-input SOT-
LUT as an example, it includes a multiplexer (MUX), SHE-
MTJ write driver and sensing circuit as shown in Fig. 5. The
stored configuration bit in SHE-MTJ device is selected to
perform write/read operations according to the different inputs
of MUXs. A SOT-PMA (Perpendicular Magnetic Anisotropy)
MTJ compact model is created with VerilogA language similar
to SPINLIB [42] and adopted for write and read simulations
in our work. The PMA-MTJ shape is 40 nm × 40 nm,
TMR = 150%, IC0 ≈ 60 µA and area product R.A = 5
Ω ·µm2. For the CMOS parts, ST-Microelectronics 45nm low
power design kits at 1.8V are adopted for write driver and
sense amplifier circuits design.
Fig. 5(a) illustrates the details of such a 2-input SOT-
LUT architecture. In SOT-LUT, configuration bits are stored
in the MTJ cells [43]. The SOT-LUT operations consist of
two procedures: reconfiguration and computing. The recon-
figuration procedure is to program the SHE-MTJ storing bits
as the required states for the specified logic functionalities.
The computing procedure is to perform the logic functionality
with the input data A and B. During the reconfiguration
procedure, the WE signal is active for write enable while RE
is inactive for read disable. The SHE-MTJs, T1, T2, T3 and
T4, can be accessed either sequentially or in parallel and then
programmed by applying the appropriate write current. During
the computing procedure, the WE signal is inactive for write
disable while RE is active for read enable. The multiplexer
selects the corresponding MTJ based on the inputs A and B
of the LUT. Then, the stored value in the MTJ is sensed by the
pre-charge sense amplifier. The sense amplifier compares the
resistance of the selected MTJ with the reference resistance
and generates the appropriate voltage level at the output for a
logic value.
1) SHE-MTJ Write Driver for Reconfiguration Procedure:
For the SHE-MTJ write driver, the LUT-input terminals are
exploited to select the MTJ bit cell for programming according
to the functionality of multiplexer. The state switching of
MTJ bit cell requires a bidirectional current source, thereby
a control logic unit is addressed to generate the required
current passing through the selected MTJ bit according to the
required programming data as shown in Fig. 5(b). Due to the
write asymmetry for P → AP (slow-write) and AP → P
(fast-write), the driving ability of write path to bit-line is
enhanced by enhancing the buffering NMOS transistor size
in BufN while the driving ability of write path to source-line
is enhanced by enhancing the buffering PMOS transistor size
in BufP [44]. Benefiting from the high switching speed (lower
than 1ns) and low spin current required (less than 60µA)
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Fig. 6: Simulation results of 2-input SOT-LUT reconfiguration
operations (write MTJ).
of SHE effect, the reconfiguration in serial will not slow the
speed since it takes only some hundred nanoseconds for the
reconfigurations of complex SOT-LUT with more than five
inputs.
The simulation results of 2-input SOT-LUT are illustrated
in Fig. 6. There are four MTJs involved, T1, T2, T3 and
T4 to be configured as the desired stetes, ST1, ST2, ST3 and
ST4, according to the input A and B of MUX network. The
word-lines WL1, WL2, WL3 and WL4 are decided by MUX
network and to represent whether the corresponding SHE-MTJ
device is selected or not. If a certain SHE-MTJ is selected, the
applied voltage on heavy metal is denoted by the voltage drop
between bit-line and source-line, where all of these SHE-MTJs
share the same source-line and their bit-lines are connected
to the MUX network. Fig. 6(b) provides the details of the
involved voltage drops between each BL and the common-
SL. For a certain selected SHE-MTJ, the applied voltage on
heavy metal is large enough to turn the AP/P state into P/AP
state where the configured states are shown in Fig. 6(a).
2) Pre-charge Sensing Amplifier During Computing: Vari-
ous sense amplifiers (SAs) have been proposed to read the state
of MTJ by detecting its resistance difference. A pre-charge
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Fig. 7: Simulation results of 2-input SOT-LUT pre-charge
sensing operations. Wwaveform of A, B, Ab/A and Bb/B
represents the inputs of MUX, respectively. Vdat and Vref
represents the output voltage of data cell and reference cell.
Vref is about 690mV while Vdat is about 480mV and 960mV
so that the sensing margin is about 210mV and 270mV for
reading P state and AP state, respectively.
sense amplifier (PCSA) is adopted in our read circuit as it is
capable to sense a pair of MTJs in different resistance and
demonstrates very high reading speed lower than 200ps [45].
As shown in Fig. 5(c), the PCSA comprises two inverters, two
PMOS transistors MP1 and MP2 in parallel with the pull-up
PMOS of the above two inverters respectively. The pull-down
NMOS transistors of the two inverters are connected to the
data cell and reference cell respectively. The PCSA requires
two operating phases depending on the control signal for read
enable RE. When RE is set as low voltage, the PCSA pre-
charges the mid-nodes Q and Q of the two inverters close to
Vdd and the amplifier is kept as a metastable state. However,
there is no stationary current in the circuit because the access
transistor MNA below is turned off by RE.
The sensing procedure briefly begins when RE is set as
high voltage while the pre-charged voltages Q and Q begin
to discharge. Due to the resistances of the two branches are
different between data cell and reference cell, the discharge
speed will be different for each branch and hence the voltage
of Q and Q will be different. Furthermore, the pull-down
strength of the inverters is then modulated by the voltage
difference between Q and Q. For example, if the data cell is
with anti-parallel state, then Rdata > Rref and the discharge
current in data branch is smaller than reference branch. During
the modulation and feedback mechanism, the voltage Q of
reference branch will be reduced faster than the voltage Q
of data branch. And when the voltage Q becomes less than
the threshold switching voltages of the inverter, the voltage Q
will be charged back to V dd and Q will continue the discharge
procedure down to V ss. Because there are never any stationary
current but only charging or discharging capacitors, the power
consumption can be expected nearly to zero.
The simulation results of 2-input SOT-LUT pre-charge
sensing scheme are comprehensively illustrated in Fig. 7. The
waveform REn represents the enable signal of amplifier circuit
from Fig. 5(c) for the beginning of each read operation. The
input signals, A, B, Ab (denoted as A) and Bb (denoted as
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B), decide which stored MTJ bit is connected to the sensing
amplifier. Without loss of generality, the MTJ states of T1, T2,
T3 and T4 in Fig. 5(a) have been configured as P, AP, P and
AP state during reconfiguration procedure, respectively.
B. Circuit Obfuscation with Reconfigurable Logic
1) Resources Utilization Exploration: Without loss of gen-
erality, numerous SOT-LUTs with more inputs could be
constructed similar to 2-input SOT-LUT shown in Fig. 5.
Typically, additional two kinds of structures are illustrated with
3-input SOT-LUTs and 4-input SOT-LUTs which requires 23
MTJs and 24 MTJs respectively. These LUTs could be con-
figured to perform 3-input or 4-input NAND/NOR/XOR and
many other logic functionalities. Taking such reconfigurable
SOT-LUT for circuit obfuscation, the total area occupied,
power consumption and performance could be compared with
conventional LUTs design. Since all of the bits of SOT-
LUT share the same current source and sense amplifier, the
number of transistors can be reduced greatly compared with
SRAM-LUT. Three kinds of configurations are compared by
counting the number of utilized transistors, including MUX-
only based design, SRAM-LUT based design and SOT-LUT
based design. n-Input LUTs are constructed to implement n-
Input logic gates with the number 2n of storage elements.
For 2-input/3-input/4-input/5-input reconfiguration logic with
different number of memory cells, MUX-only based designs
require 6/14/30/62 transistors, respectively. For SRAM-LUT
based designs, 30/62/126/254 transistors are required, respec-
tively. And for SOT-LUT based designs, only 27/36/53/86
transistors are required. The SOT-LUTs based reconfiguration
circuits could economize up to ∼66% the number of utilized
transistors compared with SRAM-LUTs based circuits (6T-
SRAM unit for each configurable memory cell). Hence, the
SOT-LUTs based circuit obfuscation is expected to achieve a
significant reduction on occupied area overhead.
It is easy to understand that the power consumption of SOT-
LUT structure is very low. First, zero standby consumption
benefiting from the non-volatility and high data-sensing speed,
the reconfigured logic blocks in standby state could be pow-
ered down completely. For the standby power of SRAM-LUTs,
the leakage power for each bit SRAM is down to about several
pW . If we assume the SRAM cells in the 2-input LUT are
in the idle state, the total power will be dominated by the
standby power as high as hundreds of pW . This decreasing
of standby power is very important for LUT applications,
as it operates with stored data and there are always some
logic blocks in idle state to wait the active command for
most of the applications. Second, the low switching current
(∼200µA) significantly reduces the dynamic reconfiguration
power. Based on the main-stream 45nm low power design kits,
the SOT-LUT circuit is characterized via numerous simulations
for the reconfiguration procedure and the energy consumption
is about tens of pJ . Such a low-energy programming scheme
is potentially important for energy efficient LUT implementa-
tions. Although the dynamic power of SOT-LUT is still much
higher than conventional SRAM-LUT due to the required MTJ
write current, it is comparatively ignored according to the
significantly decreasing of standby power.
TABLE I. A 4 × 1 MUX-basd LUT implementation for 16
possible 2-input 1-output Boolean functions.
No. x1 x2 x3 x4 Logic Function
1 0 0 0 1 F = A ·B
2 0 0 1 0 F = A ·B
3 0 0 1 1 F = A+ 0 ·B = A
4 0 1 0 0 F = A ·B
5 0 1 0 1 F = 0 ·A+B = B
6 0 1 1 0 F = A⊕B
7 0 1 1 1 F = A+B
8 1 0 0 0 F = A ·B = A+B
9 1 0 0 1 F = AB
10 1 0 1 0 F = B
11 1 0 1 1 F = A+B
12 1 1 0 0 F = A
13 1 1 0 1 F = A+B
14 1 1 1 0 F = A ·B
15 1 1 1 1 F = const 1
16 0 0 0 0 F = const 0
The logic operation latency of the reconfigured LUTs is
critical for high speed applications. Since the adopted PCSA
circuit for reading the selected SOT-LUT bit cell is similar
to SRAM structure, the latency to perform the configured
logic functionality is very close to conventional SRAM-LUT
configured logic gate. Thus, the comparison in term of area,
power and speed shows that SOT-LUT promises to replace the
conventional SRAM-LUT for most of the applications.
2) Obfuscation Procedures: The proposed SOT-LUTs are
exploited for circuit obfuscation by configuring them as logic
functions to replace conventional gates. Take an example
as shown in Fig. 1, the logic gates C1, C2 and C3 could
be replaced with SOT-LUTs according to the configurations
illustrated in Table I. Since the attackers could not obtain the
physical structures of these gates by SEM or TEM techniques,
they have to try 32 or 33 times to resolve their functionalities.
More specifically, as shown in Fig. 2, a 4×1 MUX-basd LUT
unit has four data lines {x1, x2, x3, x4}, two selection bits
{A, B}, and one output line F that comes from one of the
data lines determined by the selection network. The output
could be expressed as
F = A ·B · x1 +A ·B · x2 +A ·B · x3 +A ·B · x4
By assigning the specified proper values to the input data lines,
the SOT-LUT could be configured for realizing any 2-input
logic functions as shown in Table I.
The circuit obfuscation in this work is to assumed to thwart
Circuit Partition based Attack (CPA). Our main target is to
make sure the obfuscated gates cannot be divided by any
independent sub-circuit to perform attack individually. Based
on these assumptions, a gate classification method is proposed
in [23], which can be leveraged in an obfuscation approach
against CPA. Meanwhile, a concept named Maximum-Fan-In-
Cone (MFIC) is defined to represent a set of gates whose
outputs will directly or indirectly feed into specify gate. The
functionality of MFIC is independent of gates and signals that
do not belong to it, and can be tested or observed from inputs
and outputs of this MFIC. An attacker has only access to the
inputs and outputs of a functional IC, thus a MFIC is the
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minimum unit of an independent sub-circuit. According to the
definitions, camouflaged gates from the same class (gates that
belong to exactly the same set of MFIC) cannot be divided by
any MFIC, thus they also cannot be divided by an independent
sub-circuit to attack individually.
Once the gate classification by MFIC has been finished,
we will search the inner gates of each class to find the
one to be obfuscated if its design overhead of path delay
is minimized. Then we use the LUTs to replace 2-input, 3-
input and 4-input logic gates. When obfuscating a gate with
more, or less than 2 inputs, we have additional option to
first restructure this gate to make the gate end with a 2-input
gate, and then obfuscate the last 2-input gate. Meanwhile, we
also obfuscate the relatively large functional blocks (non-leaf
cells) with single-LUT structure so that the design overhead
could be further decreased compared with obfuscation with
several combined LUTs. All these obfuscation options will be
evaluated and demonstrated in the experimental results.
Combining all cases we can conclude that the boolean func-
tionalities of each m-input LUT appears 22
m
possibilities to
an attacker. In our obfuscation approach, we locate candidate
gates based on IC structure information. We only need to apply
polynomial search algorithm in the graph that represents the
circuit. Thus running the obfuscation algorithm can be finished
in polynomial time. For more details about the RE attack
methodologies, please refer to [22][23].
C. Security Evaluations
The designers usually care whether the obfuscated circuits
are secure, or whether the original functionalities are too
difficulty to resolve for the attackers. Thus, it is necessary
to analyze how our obfuscation approach can be resilient
to possible restore attacks to guarantee the exponential RE
complexity. Security evaluations on several attack approaches
are illustrated below:
IC Testing based Attack (ITA). In this approach, the utilized
LUTs are built to hide the information of configured func-
tionalities. To make it impossible for an attacker to resolve
the functionality of a configured LUT by justification and
sensitization with IC testing principles, we ensure either its
input cannot be justified from input pins, or its output cannot
be sensitized to output pins. For each LUT that replaces a gate
connected with output pin, we ensure at least one of its inputs
cannot be justified from the input pins. And for each LUT that
replaces an inner gate, its output cannot be sensitized to any
output pin because the gates connected to output pin of its
MFICs have been obfuscated with LUTs. More details could
be found in [11][12].
Circuit Partition based Attack (CPA). In this approach, the
gates from the same class are selected to perform obfuscation.
LUTs in the same class belong to exactly the same MFICs,
thus they cannot be divided by any MFIC to perform attacks
individually [22].
Brute Force Attack (BFA). Resilience to ITA of our approach
forces an attacker to brute force search possible functionalities
of LUTs, and resilience to CPA forces the attack to bind
the LUTs together to apply brute force. Even for a 2-input
LUT to replace 2-input logic gates, it has 16 possible func-
tionalities, thus brute force attack complexity for the attacker
will be no less than 16N , where N is the number of inner
gates obfuscated. And such exponential complexity actually
means infeasible for the attacker to perform attacks in modern
computers. Details of BFA method could be found in [12].
Side Channel Attack (SCA). All LUTs have the same area,
power and timing, regardless of the functionality that they
are configured to perform. Thus an attacker cannot get any
additional configuration information of LUTs by the side
channels [46].
In summary, the proposed obfuscation scheme is resilient
to possible restore attacks (including ITA, BFA, CPA, SCA),
thus guarantees exponential attack complexity. Moreover, the
design complexity is polynomial thus the obfuscation process
can be finished in polynomial time. Actually most of the state-
of-art obfuscation approaches could have two vulnerabilities:
(1) they are vulnerable at least one restore attacks, resulting in
a low RE complexity for an attacker; (2) the complexities to
perform obfuscation in [11][12] are exponential. They locate
candidate gates to obfuscate by exhaustively enumerating
related input patterns to see whether there exists one input
pattern that simultaneously justifies the inputs and sensitizes
the outputs. However, the enumeration has an exponential
complexity of 2m, where m is the number of inputs related to
this gate. The elaborated obfuscation approach for fixing both
vulnerabilities and detailed attack complexity analysis could
be found in [23].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
The proposed obfuscation approach with SOT-LUT circuit
is validated on standard ISCAS 85/89 and MCNC benchmark
suites. The obfuscation algorithm is implemented by JAVA
language to perform gate classification and identify candidate
gate for replacement with LUTs. The open-source ABC pro-
gram is leveraged for logic synthesis [47] and Oklahoma Stage
University standard cell library based on the TSMC 0.35µm
PDK are used for overheads measurement.
The MUXs with camouflage connectors are adopted as
the baseline for evaluating LUTs for obfuscation. In OSU
standard cell library, only MUX2X1 is provided while we
may use three MUX2X1 stacked as a MUX4X1. However,
it will result in significant design overhead especially when
the total number of MUX4X1 configured for obfuscation is
relatively large compared with the original design. Based on
the TSMC 0.35µm PDK, a transmission gate based MUX4X1
is implemented to comprehensively configure the required 16
functionalities. Each MUX4X1 consists of 2 inverters and 8
transmission gate which is made by parallel combination of
nMOS and pMOS transistors. The adopted inverter is same
as the inverter in OSU standard library, and the transistors
size in transmission gate is also same as the inverter, that is,
channel length is 0.4µm, channel width is 2µm and 4µm
for nMOS and pMOS respectively. Even though additional
approaches could be made to optimize the MUX4X1 design,
we adopt such typical design as a reference without the loss
of generality.
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TABLE II. Statistics of circuit parameters for ISCAS 85/89 and MCNC benchmark suites. # PIs is the number of input pins.
# POs is the number of output pins. # Gates is the total number of logic gates. # Nets is the total number of nets. # Level
is the maximum depth of the circuit graph. MFICs and innerGate is the MFIC number and innerGate number in largest class
after classification.
Benchmark Name # PIs # POs # Gates # Nets Area Delay # Level Largest Class
MFICs innerGate
s713 54 42 142 290 359.2 2.67 16 1 18
c432 36 7 180 363 448 3.94 23 5 41
i2 201 1 222 460 598.4 1.82 10 1 221
s1196 32 32 398 897 1051.2 2.94 17 6 22
s1238 32 32 445 999 1178.4 3.03 18 1 24
too large 38 3 519 1125 1340 4.17 25 1 148
c2670 233 140 721 1324 1704.8 2.74 18 1 133
c3540 50 22 861 1967 2360.8 4.94 31 10 82
t481 16 1 1098 2596 3324 2.46 15 1 1097
s5378 199 213 1151 2423 2980.8 2.2 14 2 84
s9234 247 250 1505 3105 4126.4 4.35 23 1 86
c7552 207 108 1612 3372 4617.6 4.8 28 1 111
i10 257 224 1904 4145 5135.2 5.94 36 10 121
c6288 32 32 2267 5220 6140.8 15.18 89 16 142
s13207 700 790 2480 4741 6831.2 4.23 26 19 137
Two kinds of LUTs are evaluated for obfuscation: SRAM-
LUT and SOT-LUT. The SRAM-LUTs adopt a typical 6T
SRAM structure as the configuration memory cells. The write
driver and read circuits of SOT-LUTs are carefully designed
and optimized for lower power consumption, high read/write
reliability and area efficient. Cadence Liberate [48] is adopted
for cell characterization of the designed MUX4X1, SRAM-
LUT and SOT-LUT. According to the characterization results,
we extract the pin-to-pin delay, input load, fan-out, and cell
area, which is built as a look-up table and represented in the
OSU035.genlib file. Meanwhile, there is an issue we have
to clarify that we are focused on evaluating the LUTs-type
obfuscation approaches in this work. Actually, the CPA attack
complexities for different obfuscation approaches (SRAM-
LUTs or SOT-LUTs) are at the same scale. These obfusca-
tion approaches essentially show a better security compared
with other dummy contact approaches [12] since the dummy
contacts still could be revealed by advanced techniques.
B. Design Overheads and Attack Complexity
The statistics of circuit parameters for the evaluated bench-
marks are list in Table II, where column 2-8 shows the number
of input pins (PIs), output pins (POs), mapped logic gates,
circuit net, original area and delay before obfuscation, and
the maximum depth of the circuit graph. Column 9-10 shows
the MFIC number and innerGate number in largest class after
performing the gate classification procedure when no nun-
functional MUXs or LUTs are added. Without loss of any
generality, the number of obfuscated gates is typically chosen
as no more than 5% of the total gate number for obfuscation
with a reasonable overhead because this ratio is usually
adopted in other state of art works[12]. The methodologies
of selecting logic gate candidates for obfuscation could refer
to [12][23].
The design overheads on area and delay are evaluated
when obfuscating 16/32/64 innerGates, and their results are
illustrated in Fig. 8, Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. In these cases,
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Area overhead for obfuscating 16 innerGates
MUX_RE SRAM_RE SOT_RE MUX_unRE SRAM_unRE SOT_unRE
(a) Area overhead.
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(b) Delay overhead.
Fig. 8: Design overheads when obfuscating 16 innerGates.
the attack complexity for a reverse engineer attacker can
still reach 264, 2128 and 2256, respectively, which are very
high attack complexities for an attacker. Several obfuscation
approaches are evaluated, including MUX RE, SRAM RE,
SOT RE, MUX unRE, SRAM unRE and SOT unRE, where
MUX RE is performing obfuscation with MUX4X1 and re-
construction strategies. SRAM RE is performing obfusca-
tion with SRAM-LUT and reconstruction strategies. SOT RE
is performing obfuscation with SOT-LUT and reconstruc-
tion strategies. MUX unRE is performing obfuscation with
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TABLE III. Max/Min/Avg design overheads for all benchmarks with different obfuscation approaches. A composite
metric Φ is defined to normalize the overall overhead of area and delay with two factors α and β respectively, while
α + β = 1 and Φ = area overhead ∗ α + delay overhead ∗ β. These two factors are determined by averaging the
two kinds of overheads with different significance according to the designers considerations. Taking an example, we
may set α = 0.5 and β = 0.5 if the delay overhead has the equal preference with area overhead, and consequently
Φ = area overhead ∗ 0.5 + delay overhead ∗ 0.5 by average overhead.
# iG† Overhead
MUX RE SRAM RE SOT RE MUX unRE SRAM unRE SOT unRE
area delay area delay area delay area delay area delay area delay
16
max 17.14% 52.75% 39.32% 49.09% 23.89% 49.09% 22.89% 52.75% 52.39% 41.82% 25.39% 41.82%
min 1.44% 0.00% 4.19% 0.00% 2.28% 0.00% 1.80% 0.00% 5.07% 0.00% 2.49% 0.00%
average 7.85% 26.12% 18.88% 24.17% 11.22% 24.17% 10.49% 26.85% 24.71% 20.36% 12.21% 20.36%
Φ16∗ 16.99% 21.53% 17.69% 18.67% 22.54% 16.29%
32
max 17.14% 60.32% 39.32% 55.47% 23.89% 55.47% 25.95% 64.55% 60.00% 47.45% 27.21% 47.45%
min 4.07% 4.58% 11.74% 2.92% 6.62% 2.92% 4.61% 0.00% 13.36% 0.00% 6.66% 0.00%
average 11.32% 36.07% 26.92% 33.20% 16.06% 33.20% 15.32% 37.01% 35.28% 28.76% 17.67% 28.49%
Φ32∗ 23.70% 30.06% 24.63% 26.17% 32.02% 23.18%
64
max 18.09% 85.91% 39.32% 78.64% 24.51% 78.64% 26.37% 97.27% 60.00% 78.18% 27.21% 78.18%
min 10.45% 9.11% 27.17% 8.15% 15.54% 8.15% 11.28% 9.11% 28.94% 4.17% 15.81% 4.17%
average 14.34% 44.30% 33.89% 40.73% 20.29% 40.73% 19.44% 45.94% 44.62% 36.35% 22.23% 36.08%
Φ64∗ 29.32% 37.31% 30.51% 32.69% 40.49% 29.15%
† Number of the selected innerGates for obfuscation.
∗ Composite metric parameter is normalized by setting α = 0.5 and β = 0.5.
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Fig. 9: Design overheads when obfuscating 32 innerGates.
MUX4X1 but without reconstruction strategies. SRAM unRE
is performing obfuscation with SRAM-LUT but without recon-
struction strategies. SOT unRE is performing obfuscation with
SOT-LUT but without reconstruction strategies. The utilized
reconstruction strategies attempt to realize a single MUX with
multiple input by connecting several MUXs with less input.
For example, a MUX4X1 could be replaced by three MUX2X1
connected.
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(a) Area overhead.
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Fig. 10: Design overheads when obfuscating 64 innerGates.
For obfuscating 16/32/64 innerGates, the LUT-based obfus-
cation has more area overheads than MUX4X1-based obfusca-
tion (as baseline) because the LUT circuit not only includes the
MUXs but also other transistors or logics. However, the LUT-
based obfuscation has less delay overheads compared with
MUX4X1-based obfuscation because the LUTs have much
more capabilities to represent complex logics with a speed-
efficient manner. Hence, the tradeoff between area and speed
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TABLE IV. Security analysis and obfuscation over-
head comparison among different approaches.
Approach Security Level Design Overhead
Dummy Contact [12] Low† Low
Pure MUX [23] Moderate‡ Moderate
SRAM LUT [13] High∗ High
SOT LUT (this work) High∗ Moderate
† Dummy contacts are visible for using SEM or TEM techniques
after de-layering and cross-section imaging.
‡ Configured MUXs are physical connected to VDD or GND,
which could be still visible if SEM or TEM is adopted.
∗ Configured bits are dynamically stored, which are invisible for
SEM or TEM.
will be very interesting for leveraging a hybrid obfuscation
methodology.
The max/min/average design overheads for all benchmarks
with different obfuscation approaches are illustrated in Table
III. Noticed that the design overheads of SRAM RE are very
close to SOT RE because most of the obfuscated gates are
reconstructed so that 2-input LUTs are preferred to be utilized.
Since the design parameters of 2-input SRAM-LUTs and
SOT-LUTs are not significantly different, the total overheads
between SRAM RE and SOT RE are also very similar with
each other which could be validated in Table III. However, if
the reconstruction is not deployed, the total area overheads of
SRAM unRE is much more (about 10%) than SOT unRE.
Because the number of utilized MOS transistors in SOT-
LUTs is less than SRAM-LUTs. Meanwhile, a composite
metric Φ is defined to normalize the overall overhead of
area and delay with two factors α and β respectively. As
shown in Table III, the obfuscation approach with SOT unRE
scheme could achieve a lowest design overhead if setting
α = 0.5 and β = 0.5 equally. In summary, the adoption
of SOT-LUTs for obfuscation could significantly reduce the
area overhead compared with the SRAM-LUTs, and reduce
the delay overhead compared with MUX-based obfuscation.
Hence, the proposed SOT-LUTs are expected to be an efficient
obfuscation applications for practical implementations. And
hopefully, both delay and area overheads can be further
reduced or controlled given a large selection pool of candidate
gates in real-life circuit.
In summary, the security analysis and design overhead
for several obfuscation approaches are also compared and
illustrated in Table IV. The obfuscation approach with dummy
contact has a low design overhead but its security is also
limited since the configured contacts could be easily revealed
by SEM or TEM techniques after de-layering the chip [12].
Using multiplexers to configure the logic functionalities could
improve the attack complexity but the physically connected
VDD or GND is still visible if SEM or TEM is adopted [23].
By dynamically configuring the functionalities according to
SRAM LUT or SOT LUT approaches, the obfuscated logics
are invisible even though the SEM or TEM techniques are
exploited, which could improve the design into a higher
security level. Additionally, the SOT LUT approach could
achieve a high security level with moderate design over-
head compared with SRAM LUT approach. Consequently the
SOT LUT based approach will be a good choice for efficient
circuit obfuscation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Circuit obfuscation is a promising way to thwart reverse
engineering. However, without carefully designing and obfus-
cation, a tricky attacker can make it really weak by performing
restore attacks. We have proposed an emerging reconfigurable
circuit for efficient obfuscation with lower area and delay over-
heads. Such circuit units exploit the magnetization states of
MTJs to store the configuration memory, which is impossible
to be detected using SEM or TEM techniques. The proposed
SOT-LUTs obfuscation approach could eliminate the potential
security risks of conventional obfuscation techniques such as
MUX-based or SRAM-LUTs based approaches, and will be
expected as a promising anti-reverse-engineering technique for
practical IP protection applications.
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